Abstract
Introduction
Judicial review refers to the authority of a court to review the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. It means that a court can invalidate laws or decisions contrary to higher laws or regulations, particularly the Constitution. The term of judicial review is often used interchangeably with constitutional review. Nevertheless, judicial review has a broader meaning compared than a constitutional review. In this context, judicial review can both examine the constitutional validity of laws and regulations as well as administrative actions and decisions, while constitutional review is more specific to review the constitutionality of laws and regulations. judicial review authority is exercised by the Supreme Court and other lower courts. This model is used in countries such as the United States of America, Australia, Canada, India and the Philippines. The second model is also known as the centralised model or the European model. 3 This model gives the authority to review the constitutionality of laws to the Constitutional Court as a separate judicial institution from the Supreme Court, as occurs in countries such as Austria, Germany, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. The innovation in this constitutional system has been influenced by Hans Kelsen (1881 Kelsen ( -1973 . 4 Therefore, this model is also known as the Kelsenian model. 5 Indonesian judicial review system follows this Kelsenian model.
The Indonesian Constitution granted authority to review the constitutionality of national laws to the Constitutional Court, whilst the Supreme Court is granted an authority to review the legality of regulations below the level of national law. This mechanism creates a dualism of judicial review system that led to the complexity of the legal system in Indonesia. The question is what are the legal problems caused by the dualism of judicial reviews system adopted in Indonesia? and how can the problems be prevented or solved? The development of judicial review in Indonesian judicial system can be divided into three main periods: the Soekarno era from 1945 to 1966; the Soeharto era from 1966 to 1998 and the constitutional reform era from 1998 to present. As explained previously, the current judicial review in Indonesia follows the European or the Centralised model of judicial review. In 1949, however, Indonesia followed the American or the decentralised model of judicial review. In this section, I will discuss the development of legal policy regarding judicial review system in Indonesia by tracing the three different periods mentioned above.
Discussion

Legal Policy of Judicial Review System
First Period: Soekarno Era (1945-1966)
Although the mechanism of constitutional review was finally formed after the Constitutional Court establishment in 2003, the discussion and debate about the need for a constitutional review system had occurred in the drafting process of the first Indonesian Constitution, prior to independence in 1945. During a meeting of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or BPUPKI) in July 1945, one of the constitutional drafters, Muhammad Yamin, proposed that the Supreme Court (Balai Agung) should have a power to review laws not only against the Constitution but also customary law and Islamic law. Yamin used the term of 'comparing' (membanding), which refers to the term of 'reviewing' (menguji). The proposal delivered by Yamin was challenged by another BPUPKI member, Soepomo, citing two main reasons. The first reason was that Indonesia did not adopt the concept of separation of powers as implemented by other countries. Therefore, the judiciary could not control the other state powers in making laws. According to Soepomo, the issue whether a law was contrary to the Constitution or not was not a judicial matter, but a political matter. He also argued that the judicial review system would not be appropriate in the Indonesian context.
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The second reason was that Indonesian legal experts did not have much experience in exercising a judicial review system at that time. Soepomo compared Indonesia with Austria, Germany and the Czech Republic that had special courts to deal with constitutional matters. For these reasons, he suggested that Indonesia was not ready to apply the judicial review system. Given that there was no consensus during the meeting, Yamin's proposal to give judicial review power to the Supreme Court was not inserted into the 1945 Constitution. Furthermore, the 1945 Constitution enacted on 18 August 1945 was replaced by the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia or the RIS Constitution (1949) (1950) . The provisions contained in the RIS Constitution were strongly influenced by the United States, including the adoption of the American model of judicial review. The RIS Constitution set a judicial review mechanism that authorised the Supreme Court and other ordin-ary courts to review the constitutionality of fe-deral or state laws.
9 However, the RIS Constitution was applied for less than one year, from 27 December 1949 until 17 August 1950, and there was not a single case handled by the Supreme Court related to judicial review.
Moreover, Indonesia changed the RIS Constitution to 1950 Provisional Constitution (1950 -1959 . The 1950 Provisional Constitution was intended to be temporary until a permanent constitution was formed. During the constitutional drafting, the Indonesian Judges Association (IKAHI) suggested that the Supreme Court should have a power to review the constitutionality of legislations. The proposal was discussed in the Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), which had been established based on the results of the 1955 General Elections to form a permanent Constitution. In their discussions, the Constituent Assembly agreed to establish a special 7 Ibid, page 305. court consisting of justices who were authorised to review legislations.
Unfortunately, after conducting the sessions for two and a half years, the Constituent Assembly was unable to complete the main task of forming a permanent Constitution due to a deadlock among its members, particularly on a very sensitive issue related to concepts and relations between state and religion. Consequently, an initial agreement to establish a judicial review system could not be implemented. Given that the Constituent Assembly could not manage to create a new Constitution for replacing the 1950 Provisional Constitution, President Soekarno declared the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and to restore the validity of the 1945 Constitution as the permanent Constitution of Indonesia.
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Second Period: Soeharto Era (1966-1998)
Discussions for creating a judicial review system also occurred during the New Order under the Soeharto's administration . Based on Law No. 14 Year 1970 concerning the Judicial Power, the Supreme Court was granted a power of judicial review.
11 However, the power was limited to review of regulations against laws. The Judicial Power Law did not regulate the mechanism to review the constitutionality of laws. Moreover, the related provisions were amended by Law No. 14 Year 1985 concerning the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the new provisions asserted that the Supreme Court only had a power to review regulations below national laws against laws only, but not against the Constitution.
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The absence of a constitutional review system at that time was caused by the Indonesian constitutional structure that implemented the distribution of a power system. Consequently, it created supremacy of parliament in the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permu- syawaratan Rakyat or MPR). In practice, the doctrine meant other branches of government were not allowed to intervene with the legislative branch powers. In addition, the absence of constitutional review mechanisms was considered a deliberate action by Soeharto to maintain power.
Despite this view, Soeharto genuinely and consistently suggested implementing the 1945 Constitution in his speeches. Lacking a state institution with authority to review and interpret the 1945 Constitution, Soeharto held full power in interpreting the laws that perpetuated his authority for 32 years. As a result, there were only 12 cases relating to judicial review after the Supreme Court was given a limited power of judicial review in 1970 until the constitutional reform occurred in 1998.
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Third Period: Constitutional Reform (1998-Present)
Discussion on the need of a constitutional review system re-occurred during the constitutional amendment process in 2000. After discussing the mechanism, the MPR issued Decision No. III/MPR/2000 granting the MPR a power to review the constitutionality of laws. The parliament supremacy doctrine was the main foundation in establishing this mechanism. However, it cannot be categorised as a judicial review mechanism since the power would be exercised by the legislative, not by the judiciary. Thus, this mechanism is best categorised as legislative review, not judicial review. However, the MPR never exercised its power because the system was not clear. Therefore, the MPR members proposed to establish a judicial institution called the Constitutional Court.
14 The MPR members were divided into two opinions for determining judicial review powers to be granted to the Constitutional Court. should only review the constitutionality of law, while regulations under the national law could only be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The main reason was to avoid practical difficulties related to the high number of laws and regulations directly related to the litigation process handled by the Supreme Court and lower ordinary courts. 15 The second opinion was that the constitutionality of all laws and regulations should be reviewed by the Constitutional Court. The aim of incorporating this constitutional review mechanism was to obtain consistent considerations and decisions in judicial review cases, as practiced in other countries.
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The final decision inserted into the Constitution was that the Constitutional Court could only review the constitutionality of national laws, while the Supreme Court retained the power to review the legality of regulations. Thus, the current judicial review system in Indonesia is embracing the dualism of judicial review system exercised by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. Consequently, the judicial review mechanism becomes more complicated, as I will explain below.
Dualism of Judicial Review System
In the Indonesian legal system, there exists a hierarchical structure of laws adopted from the pyramid of law theory by Hans Kelsen, known as Stufenbau des Rechts. Presently, the types and hierarchy of laws in Indonesia consist of the 1945 Constitution, People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Decision, Law or Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Interim Emergency Law or Perppu), Government Regulation, Presidential Regulation, Provincial Regulation and Regency/City Regulation. The legal power of those laws is in accordance with the hierarchical structure ranging from the highest to the lowest level.
Regarding the judicial review system, Indonesia has two separate mechanisms. After the Constitutional Court declared the decision, indirectly annulling the Supreme Court decision, no institutional conflict occurred between them. However, if such inconsistency of interpretation occurs frequently, then, most likely, conflict or dispute will result between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, as emerged in other countries. 20 This conflict may occur because the Indonesian Constitutional Court is not granted power to assess or examine the Supreme Court decisions. This system is different from, for instance, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany which is formally given the power to re-examine the Supreme Court decisions related to fundamental rights violations of citizens using the constitutional complaint mechanism. Third, in the previous judicial review system, the MPR decision was not placed in the hierarchy of laws.
22 Currently, it is in the hierarchy of laws under the Constitution, but it is above the level of law. As a result, the constitutionality of MPR decisions cannot be reviewed by the Constitutional Court since the Court can only review the constitutionality of laws or interim emergency laws. The absence of this mechanism has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court's decision, stating that the Court does not have a power to review the constitutionality of the MPR decisions.
23 Thus, the MPR decisions have caused a constitutional problem in the hierarchy of laws because it cannot be reviewed by judicial institutions, neither the Constitutional Court nor the Supreme Court.
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Based on the three major problems explained above, I am of the opinion that the constitutional review of all laws and regulations under the Constitution should be integrated into one judicial institution in order to resolve the dualism of the judicial review system in Indonesia. Establishing a constitutional review mechanism under a one-roof system can cover the vacuum of legal remedy. In addition, it can prevent inconsistency of interpretations in a judicial review case decided by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. By considering several factors, such as experiences in deciding constitutional review cases, 25 creasingly important. The Water Resources cases show that, although a law does not conflict with the Constitution, its implementing regulations can be contrary to the Constitution. Given that neither the Constitutional Court nor the Supreme Court hold jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of regulations or decisions, many regulations or decisions considered contrary to Constitution are still implemented today.
In addition, the Water Resources (2013) decision created a new practice of constitutional adjudication in Indonesia, whereby the Constitutional Court can review government regulations indirectly, providing that the related laws, used as the legal basis for making the regulations, have been declared conditionally constitutional or conditionally unconstitutional. This decision also creates jurisprudence for the Court as an entry point to examine the constitutionality of government regulations or decisions in the future.
Conclusion
Discussion about the need for a constitutional review mechanism in the Indonesian judicial system has been debated since the pre-independence in 1945. However, the idea was rejected because it was considered incompatible with the system and form of Indonesian government at that time. The constitutional review mechanism in Indonesia was formed for the first time in the RIS Constitution, yet there was not a single case of constitutional review lodged to the Supreme Court. The constitutional review mechanism was re-established after the constitutional reform occurred in 1999 to 2002. The Constitutional Court was created to exercise the constitutional review power.
However, there is a problem in the current constitutional review system that places the Constitutional Court in a position that only serves to review the constitutionality of laws against the Constitution, while the Supreme Court merely serves to review the legality of regulations against laws. In other words, there is no mechanism to review the constitutionality of regulations below the level of national law, whereas many regulations and executive decisions allegedly violate the Constitution.
Suggestions
The powers of judicial review granted to the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court are directly mandated by the Constitution. In the future, these jurisdictions should be integrated to review all laws and regulations against the Constitution in the hands of the Constitutional Court. Thus, consistency of interpretation in dealing with constitutional review cases can be well maintained. The most ideal way to integrate these jurisdictions is to amend the Constitution concerning the judicial powers.
